Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
All Computer Science and Engineering
Research

Computer Science and Engineering

Report Number: WUCS-99-02
1999-01-01

eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server
Tuomas Sandholm
This paper presents eMediator, a next generation electronic commerce server that
demonstrates some ways in which AI, algorithmic support, and game theoretic incentive
engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable auction
house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, novel
bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type. Second, its leveled
commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal contract price and decommitting
penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols, taking into account that
rational agents will decommit insincerely in taking into account that rational agents will
decommit... Read complete abstract on page 2.

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Sandholm, Tuomas, "eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server" Report Number:
WUCS-99-02 (1999). All Computer Science and Engineering Research.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research/480

Department of Computer Science & Engineering - Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1045 - St. Louis, MO - 63130 - ph: (314) 935-6160.

This technical report is available at Washington University Open Scholarship: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/
cse_research/480

eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server
Tuomas Sandholm

Complete Abstract:
This paper presents eMediator, a next generation electronic commerce server that demonstrates some
ways in which AI, algorithmic support, and game theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the
efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable auction house includes a variety of generalized
combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, novel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for
choosing an auction type. Second, its leveled commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal
contract price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols,
taking into account that rational agents will decommit insincerely in taking into account that rational
agents will decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its safe exchange planner enables
unenforced anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and sequencing those chunks to
be delivered safely in alternation between the buyer and the seller. Each of the three components is based
on different types of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new
algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible.

